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JURISDICTION 
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals on December 18, 
1996. Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 44, the Court of Appeals transferred the appeal to the 
Utah Supreme Court because it is taken from an order, judgment or decree of a district court 
in a civil case, not involving domestic relations. Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 42, on May 15, 
1997, the Utah Supreme Court returned the appeal the Court of Appeals. 
QUESTION FOR REVIEW 
In interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-105(2) (1994) according to its plain and 
ordinary meaning, did the district court correctly hold that § 31A-21-105(2) allows an insurer 
to rescind a policy based on the insured's innocent or unknowing misrepresentations which 
are material and relied on by the insurer, or which contribute directly to the loss, thereby 
properly granting summary judgment in favor of appellee Mutual Protective Insurance 
Company? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An appellate court reviews a district court's conclusions of law in support a grant of 
summary judgment for correctness, according no deference. Schurtrz v. BMW of N. Am.. 
Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-105(2) is determinative of this appeal: 
1 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (5), no misrepresentation or breach of 
an affirmative warranty affects the insurer's obligations under the policy unless: 
(a) The insurer relies on it and it is either material or is made with 
intent to deceive; or 
(b) The fact misrepresented or falsely warranted contributes to the 
loss. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order granting the Motion for Summary Judgment of 
defendant/appellee Mutual Protective Insurance Company ("MPIC") on the breach of 
contract claim of plaintifffappellant C. Stanley Derbidge, personal representative of the estate 
of Esma S. Seymour. In support of its motion for summary judgment, MPIC argued that 
under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-105(2), it was entitled to void an insurance policy issued 
to Mrs. Seymour because of Mrs. Seymour's material misrepresentations regarding her 
medical history on the insurance application. The district court granted MPIC's motion, 
holding that § 31A-21-105(2) allowed rescission for innocent or unknowing 
misrepresentations which are material and relied on by the insurer, or which contribute to the 
loss. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are undisputed. In June 1989, Mrs. Seymour met with Vaughn J. Lewis, an 
MPIC representative, to complete an application for disability insurance. See Initial Pretrial 
Order ("IPTO"), ^ 4 (R. at 47). The application inquired whether Mrs. Seymour, in the past 
2 
five years, had received medical advice or treatment, taken any medications, been confined 
to any hospital and/or nursing facility or consulted with a physician for any of several 
enumerated conditions, including "high blood pressure" and "Organic mental disease or 
disorder (such as Alzheimer's Disease)." IPTO, Tf 5 (R. at 47). Mrs. Seymour answered yes 
only with respect to high blood pressure, but answered no to all other listed conditions, 
including the question concerning "Organic mental disease or disorder (such as Alzheimer's 
Disease)." LcL The application also asked whether, other than as set forth previously, Mrs. 
Seymour had been hospitalized within the last five years. Mrs. Seymour answered no. Brief 
of Plaintiff/Appellant C. Stan Derbidge ("Appellant's Br.") at Addendum 3. 
Based on this application, a long-term care policy was issued by MPIC to Mrs. 
Seymour, effective July 16, 1989. IPTO, f 9 (R. at 50-51). Part K(l) of the policy read as 
follows: 
(1) Entire contract; changes: this policy, with any 
attachments (and the copy of your application), is the entire 
contract of insurance. No agent may change it in any way. Only 
an officer of ours can approve a change. That change must be 
shown in the policy. 
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Part K(2) of the policy reads: 
(2) Time limit on certain defenses: After two years from 
the policy date, no misstatements, except fraudulent 
3 
misstatements in the application for the policy, can be used to 
void the policy or to deny a claim for loss incurred or disability 
commencing after the expiration of such two year period. 
LI 
Less than six months after the insurance policy became effective, Mrs. Seymour 
submitted proof of loss, claiming that she required semi-skilled care in a nursing facility from 
January 3, 1990 forward for an indefinite period because of Alzheimer's disease. IPTO, p. 
2 (R. at 45). After MPIC received Mrs. Seymour's claim, it requested and obtained Mrs. 
Seymour's medical records which revealed that in November 1985, she was hospitalized to 
evaluate and treat a problem of "mental obtundation with memory impairment." Mrs. 
Seymour's records also revealed that this condition continued from 1985 forward. IPTO, ffif 
6, 7(a)-7(i) (R. at 47-50). Mrs. Seymour was hospitalized again in 1988 for chest pain. 
During this hospitalization, Mrs. Seymour's attending physician again noted her problems 
with memory impairment and mental confusion, and made a diagnosis of probable organic 
brain syndrome. IdL 
On the application for insurance, Mrs. Seymour did not reveal either her 1985 or 1988 
hospitalizations, her past memory impairments and mental confusion or her diagnosis of 
probable organic brain syndrome. IPTO, ^ 5 (R. at 47). On February 28, 1990, MPIC 
voided Mrs. Seymour's policy because in her application for insurance she failed to disclose 
facts regarding her memory impairment and organic brain syndrome/Alzheimer's disease 
which, if disclosed, would have resulted in MPIC's denial of her application. IPTO, ^ f 10 (R. 
4 
at 51). These undisclosed facts contributed directly to Mrs. Seymour's claim for nursing 
home care because of Alzheimer's disease. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Section 31A-21-105(2) provides three separate grounds for rescission of an insurance 
policy by an insurer based on a misrepresentation by the insured, including 1) where the 
insurer relies on the misrepresentation and it is material; or 2) where the insurer relies on the 
misrepresentation and it is made with intent to deceive; or 3) where the fact misrepresented 
contributes to the loss. These grounds for rescission are disjunctive, not conjunctive, and an 
insurer need only prove one ground in order to rescind the contract. Only the "intent to 
deceive" prong of the statute requires a knowing or intentional misrepresentation. An insurer 
may rescind a policy based on an innocent or non-intentional misrepresentation where it is 
material and relied on, or where it contributes to the loss. Here, it is undisputed that MPIC 
relied on material misrepresentations in issuing the long-term care policy to Mrs. Seymour, 
and the material misrepresentations contributed to the loss. Moreover, MPIC did not waive 
its rights under the statute. Therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment 
in favor of MPIC under § 31A-21-105(2). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER BECAUSE PURSUANT TO 
§ 31A-21-105(2), AN INSURER MAY VOID A POLICY BASED ON AN 
INNOCENT OR UNKNOWING MISREPRESENTATION WHERE IT 
IS MATERIAL AND RELIED ON OR WHERE IT CONTRIBUTES TO 
THE LOSS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-105(2) provides three separate grounds for rescission of 
an insurance policy by an insurer because of misrepresentations by the insured: 
(1) The insurer relies on the misrepresentation and it is material; or 
(2) The insurer relies on the misrepresentation and it is made with intent to 
deceive; or 
(3) The fact misrepresented contributes to the loss. 
These grounds for rescission are disjunctive, not conjunctive. The insurer need only 
prove one of them in order to invalidate the policy. See Berger v. Minnesota Mutual Life 
Ins. Co.. 723 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1986) (holding that three prongs of § 31A-21-105(2) are 
disjunctive).1 The statute allows for rescission of a policy for a misrepresentation that is 
1
 See also Model Utah Jury Instructions - Civil 21.1 (1993 ed.): 
CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH MISREPRESENTATION IN 
APPLICATION WILL VOID INSURANCE COVERAGE. 
The failure to disclose information or the affirmative 
misrepresentation of information on an insurance application 
will void coverage under the insurance policy if: 
1. The insurer relies on the omission or 
misrepresentation and the nondisclosed or misrepresented fact 
is material to the insurer; or 
(continued...) 
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material either to the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed without having to show 
any intent to deceive on the part of the insured. The state of mind of the applicant is 
therefore irrelevant where (1) the insurer relies on the nondisclosed or misrepresented fact 
and it is material or (2) the nondisclosed or misrepresented fact contributes to the loss. 
It is undisputed that in the application Mrs. Seymour failed to disclose her significant 
medical history of progressive mental impairment and mental confusion and her diagnosis 
of probable organic brain syndrome, including her hospitalization for memory impairment 
in 1985. IPTO, ffl[ 5- 7(a)-(i), (R. at 47-50). Mrs. Seymour also failed to disclose that she 
was hospitalized again in 1988 for chest pain, and that during this hospitalization, her doctor 
noted her continuing difficulties with memory impairment and confusion, and made a 
diagnosis of probable organic brain syndrome. Id. 
It is undisputed that MPIC issued the insurance policy to Mrs. Seymour in reliance 
on the accuracy of the medical history and information provided in her application. It is also 
undisputed that if MPIC had been made aware of Mrs. Seymour's medical history of 
progressive memory impairment and mental confusion and the diagnosis of probable organic 
(...continued) 
2. The insurer relies on the omission or 
misrepresentation and the applicant's omission or 
misrepresentation was made with an intent to deceive the 
insurer; or 
3. The fact omitted or misrepresented contributed 
directly to the loss for which coverage is claimed. 
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brain syndrome when she applied for the long term policy, the policy would not have been 
issued. IPTO,f 10 (R. at 51). 
Here, the district court correctly granted summary judgment because the undisputed 
facts show that Mrs. Seymour misrepresented facts which were material, on which MPIC 
relied, and which contributed to the loss. Thus, as a matter of law MPIC was entitled to void 
the policy under the first and third alternatives of § 31A-21-105(2). 
On appeal, appellant argues that the district court incorrectly granted summary 
judgment because the term "misrepresentation" as used in the statute requires a knowing or 
intentional misrepresentation, and a factual dispute exists regarding whether Mrs. Seymour 
intentionally or knowingly misrepresented her medical history of mental impairment and 
organic brain damage. See Appellant's Br. at 8-17. However, this argument fails as 
appellant's interpretation of the statute is untenable. 
First, this interpretation renders the "intent to deceive" prong of the statute redundant. 
Utah case law requires that, if possible, a statute be read in a way that gives effect to all of 
its provisions. In re Richard Worthen. 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 1996) ( "In analyzing a 
statute's plain language, we must attempt to give each part of the provision a relevant and 
independent meaning so as to give effect to all of its terms''^: Olympia Sales Co. v. Long. 
604 P.2d 919, 921 (Utah 1979) ("We conceive it to be our duty, if possible, to adopt that 
interpretation which will give effect to each provision and harmonize them with each 
other, so that neither will be meaningless."). Section 31A-21-105(2) is disjunctive, offering 
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three alternatives under which a policy may be voided. Only the second alternative requires 
a misrepresentation made with "intent to deceive"; the first and third alternatives have no 
scienter requirement. If, as appellant contends, the term misrepresentation requires a 
knowing or intentional misrepresentation for all three alternatives, the second alternative's 
requirement of "intent to deceive" would be meaningless.2 
The evolution of the current statute demonstrates that appellant's interpretation is 
incorrect. Earlier versions of the statute explicitly required "intent to deceive" by the insured 
in all cases before the insurer could rescind. See Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-8 (1953) (repealed 
1963). However, the statute was completely rewritten in 1963 to provide for three separate 
alternatives under which an insurer could rescind the policy, only one of which required an 
intentional misrepresentation.3 
2Appellant seems to suggest, without explanation or support, that the intent to deceive 
prong is not redundant as it requires a "fraudulent" misrepresentation, as opposed to simply 
a knowing misrepresentation. See Appellant's Br. at 14. However, Appellant does not 
explain how a "fraudulent" misrepresentation differs from a knowing or intentional 
misrepresentation. In fact, under Utah law a fraudulent misrepresentation is one that the 
defendant knew to be false or that the defendant made recklessly. See e ^ , Model Utah Jury 
Instructions - Civil 17.1 and 17.2 (1993 ed.). 
3As amended in 1963, the statute allowed rescission for misrepresentation that was 1) 
fraudulent; or 2) material either to the acceptance of the risk, or to the hazard assumed by the 
insurer; or 3) the insurer would not have issued the policy if the true facts had been known. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-8 (1974) (repealed 1986). In 1985, the statute was amended 
to its present form. The disjunctive structure and the basic categories of the statute were 
retained, but the "fraudulent" prong was replaced with the current "intent to deceive" prong. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-105(2). 
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Appellant argues that the current version of the statute must be read to include a 
knowing or intentional element because a knowing misrepresentation was required by 
common law, and "the statute has not been expressly changed, which would be required for 
legislation in contravention of the Common Law . . . ." Appellant's Br. at 12. Appellant 
misstates the law. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (1996) provides: 
[T]he rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly 
construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes establish the 
laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their provisions and 
all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the 
objects and to promote justice. 
Finally, while appellant cites a number of cases, almost all of them predated the 1963 
amendments to the statute, and thus provide no support for his argument.4 In fact, the only 
cases decided since the 1963 amendments to the statute suggest, consistent with MPIC's 
position, that only the "intent to deceive" prong requires an intentional misrepresentation. 
In Berger, the Utah Supreme Court held that the post-1963 statutory alternatives "are stated 
in the disjunctive, not the conjunctive. In order to invalidate a policy because of a 
misrepresentation by the insured, the insurer need prove applicable only one of the above 
provisions." 723 P.2d at 390. 
The only case Appellant cites interpreting the current version of the statute — Hardy 
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America. 763 P.2d 761 (Utah 1988) -- supports MPIC's 
4E.g.. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society. 108 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1940); Wootton 
v. Combined Ins. Co. of America. 395 P.2d 724 (Utah 1964); Chadwick v. Beneficial Life 
Insurance Co.. 191 P. 240 (Utah 1919). 
10 
interpretation as it confirms that the intent to deceive prong is only one of several alternatives 
that allow an insurer to void a policy under § 31A-21-105(2): 
[T]he insurer must prove that the misrepresentation was made with the intent to 
deceive or that the matter misrepresented was material or that the insurer in good faith 
would not have issued the policy if the true facts had been made known to the insurer. 
Id. at 766 (emphasis added). 
Under the clear terms of the statute and the undisputed facts, the district court 
correctly granted summary judgment in this case. Mrs. Seymour made material 
misrepresentations on the application, and those misrepresentations were relied on by MPIC 
and they contributed to the loss. The district court's entry of summary judgment for MPIC 
must be affirmed.5 
II. THE TERMS OF THE APPLICATION DO NOT WAIVE MPIC'S 
RIGHTS UNDER § 31A-21-105. 
Appellant argues that even assuming the statute does not require an intentional 
misrepresentation, MPIC has contractually agreed to void policies only for an intentional 
misrepresentation. Appellant's Br. at 8-10. Appellant's argument is based on a section of 
the application which contains a certification by the applicant that the information provided 
5Appellant suggests that an insurer could prevent the "problem" created by 
misrepresentations on insurance applications through better and more thorough underwriting 
practices. Appellant's Br. at 10-11. This policy argument is not persuasive, and more 
importantly, it does not change MPIC's right to rescind under § 31 A-21-105(2). 
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in the application is "true, full and complete to the best of [the applicant's] knowledge and 
information." Appellant's Br. at Addendum 3. 
Appellant's argument fails under the language of the contract and the principles of 
waiver. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Pasker. Gould, Ames & 
Weaver v. Morse. 887 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah App. 1994). Part K(2) of the policy, quoted 
above, provides that for the first two years nonfraudulent or innocent misrepresentation in 
the application can be used by MPIC to void the policy or deny the loss. This policy 
provision alone makes clear that MPIC did not intentionally relinquish its statutory right to 
void a policy for an insured's material misrepresentation. The language on which Appellant 
relies, which is standard to most insurance contracts, is merely a certification that the 
applicant has answered truthfully; it does not mean that intentional misrepresentation is 
required before the insurer can void the policy. Appellant's argument that such standard 
language is a waiver of MPIC's right to void the policy pursuant to the terms § 31A-21-
105(2), particularly in light of the policy language to the contrary, is unsupportable. 
12 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, the district court's order granting MPIC's motion for 
summary judgment should be affirmed. 
DATED this |~f*day of July, 1997. 
DAVID B. WATKISS 
CAROLYN COX 
BRETT J. DelPORTO 
WATKISS DUNNING & WATKISS, P.C. 
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(801)530-1500 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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